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  Naval aviation is on the brink of taking advantage 
of a 12 year old capability.  Naval commercial derivative 
aircraft have had the ability to navigate in instrument 
meteorological conditions using global positioning 
technology for nearly as long as civil commercial-for-hire 
aircraft.  However, tactical naval aircraft, like the E-2C 
Hawkeye, are now only beginning to obtain and install the 
necessary technology to meet federal aviation regulations 
for satellite based area navigation. 
Worldwide airspace controlling agencies have mandated 
the use of navigation equipment that meets highly specific 
performance standards prior to entry in required navigation 
performance airspace.  Aircraft not compliant with these 
standards are denied flight clearance or experience 
clearance delays.  The Department of Defense has issued 
policy guidance that allows military aviation organizations 
to self-certify satellite based navigation technologies to 
meet required navigation performance standards. 
In many ways, military navigation technologies far 
exceed the performance requirements for civil and 
international airspace use.  These technologies, however, 
are highly specific in their mission orientation and must 
demonstrate their compatibility with civil aviation 
standards. 
This study focused on the source and the specifics of 
navigation performance requirements.   Domestic and 
international regulations and policies were reviewed as 
they pertain to civil aviation, and then applied to 
military aviation.  Critical technical standards documents 
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were reviewed to determine the best strategy for complying 
with civil and international regulations.  Lessons learned 
from previous E-2C navigation system evaluations were also 
reviewed and incorporated within this compliance strategy.  
Compliance and self-certification responsibilities belong 
to aircraft specific program managers within the Navy’s 
acquisition organization. 
Sophisticated navigation systems incorporating 
satellite positioning technology require a tailored 
approach toward compliance demonstration.  Military 
receivers with precise positioning capability satisfy many 
of the required availability, accuracy and containment 
standards.  To satisfy civil requirements, correctly keyed, 
military navigation systems may be evaluated according to 
standards typically applied to the most highly augmented 
standard civil systems.  This thesis contains a 
comprehensive list of compliance items selected for their 
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CHAPTER 1:  EVOLVING AVIATION 
Introduction 
Despite the lengthy and considerable negative impact 
to the commercial airline industry following the tragic 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the skies are 
becoming more crowded.  Figure 1 is an illustration of the 
increase in density of both airplanes and electromagnetic 
emissions in the radio frequency (RF) spectrum over 
time[2].  The 2006 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Aerospace Forecast states that “the number of domestic 
commercial aircraft is forecast to grow from 7,836 in 2005 
to 10,677 in 2017, an average annual growth rate of 2.6 
Past Present Future
...More Signals in the Same Radio Spectrum...
Figure 1 
Illustration of Increase in Air Traffic 
and Radio Frequency Congestion 
Source: http://pma209.navair.navy.mil/teams/navigation/cnsatm/challenges.asp
30 Nov 2006 
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percent or 237 aircraft annually”[3].  Total enplanements 
are forecast to increase by 68 percent by 2020[4].  
Technologies have been developed to accommodate the 
increase in aircraft and signal density.  These 
technologies must be integrated in Navy aircraft whose 
capabilities must conform to global requirements, which are 
increasing as available airspace continues to shrink. 
The airwaves are also becoming more congested with RF 
signals.  The aerospace industry must compete with booming 
industries in technologies such as cellular phones and wi-
fi.  What was once an allocated and assigned “spectrum”, 
has become a dynamic multifaceted commodity.  Ownership of 
a piece of the spectrum has given way to spread-spectrum 
technology in which spectrum-sharing and dynamically 
allocated frequency assignments have become the norm.  The 
sophisticated parceling of RF signals requires a 
sophisticated response for aviation applications. 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) have demonstrated 
reliable and consistent receipt of signals use in 
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  IMC is a 
condition in which a pilot of an aircraft does not have 
external visual reference to the earth’s horizon or the 
airspace around him.  Military applications require 
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reliable and consistent receipt while in foreign, specially 
tailored or special use airspace.  Accurate and reliable 
navigational systems allow for safe operation of multiple 
aircraft within a given airspace, without visual contact 
between them or the ground.  It also help keeps aircraft 
within a tightly bound region. 
A Global Approach to Crowded Skies 
To address such a complex and dynamic problem, the FAA 
and the International Civil Aerospace Organization (ICAO) 
recognized the need to draw upon the expertise of multiple 
sources within the aerospace industry to recommend viable 
and affordable solutions.  Teamed with the RTCA, formerly 
the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 
recommendations were outlined to develop a performance-
based global air traffic management (GATM) system.  RTCA is 
a not-for-profit corporation made up of a widely varied 
group of avionics and aerospace-industry partners.  It was 
founded to advance the art of aviation and aviation 
electronic systems for public benefit.  It serves as a 
Federal Advisory Committee to develop consensus-based 
recommendations concerning contemporary aviation issues[5].  
The FAA relies heavily on RTCA recommendations in all of 
its standard technical requirements.  A proposed 
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performance-based system is composed of measurable safety 
and security parameters.  The ultimate goal is to achieve a 
verifiable air traffic capacity and navigation performance 
efficiency, the foundations of a performance-based 
navigation system. 
The underpinning of GATM is the concept of a Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).  A GNSS provides 
worldwide positioning and time information in all weather 
and to an unlimited number of users.  It is composed of 
orbiting satellite constellations, earth-based receivers, 
and system integrity monitoring stations.  GNSS is the 
foundational solution to accurate and reliable global 
positioning, navigation and timing (PNT). 
Two satellite systems have obtained certification from 
the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB): 
NAVSTAR GPS, developed by the United States (US), and 
Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), 
currently operated by Russia[6].  Also, the European Union 
and European Space Agency have announced plans to launch a 
space-based PNT system called Galileo.  
The US NAVSTAR system consists of three major 
elements, referred to as segments: the space segment, the 





Source: National Spaced Based PNT, Executive Committee Website 
currently a constellation of 30 satellites, depicted in 
figure 2.  They are grouped in 6 orbital planes at near-
stationary orbit 11,000 miles above the earth.  These 
satellites transmit complex signals to a receiving system, 
the “user segment”.  The receiving system performs 
computations to determine the receiver’s position relative 
to an accepted, world-wide coordinate system, currently the 
World Geodetic System 1984.  The user segment consists of 
antennas, receivers and signal processors to provide 
position, velocity, and precise timing for a particular 
user’s applications.  Finally, the control element consists 
of monitoring stations, ground antennas, a master control 
station and a backup master control station to sample and 
evaluate the health of each satellite[7].  
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From the beginning, NAVSTAR was designed for dual use.  
US government agencies have access to the most accurate 
service, known as Precise Positioning Service (PPS), while 
the general public may receive the potentially less 
accurate Standard Positioning Service (SPS).  The 
difference in the services can be errors intentionally 
introduced through a process called Selective Availability 
(SA).  Intentional degradation of the SPS was discontinued 
on May 1, 2000 by presidential order[8]. 
   Since the discontinuation of selective avail-
ability, highly accurate GPS signals have been available to 
the entire general public.  Today, exceptionally capable 
GPS receivers are available at a reasonable cost.  These 
affordable, highly accurate navigation systems have 
accuracies of a few feet and are available for automobile, 
marine and aviation applications.  
Over the past 13 years, GPS has matured into a robust 
critical aid to navigation as it was envisioned in the 
1960s.  Today, most IMC certified aircraft include at least 
one GPS receiver.  Advanced navigation systems integrate 




The most common aviation use of GPS is for area 
navigation or RNAV.  RNAV is airspace navigation in which 
the pilot of an aircraft may choose any course within a 
network of navigation beacons or waypoints.  RNAV is 
possible with equipment that calculates position relative 
to ground-based beacons or GPS satellites.  Using RNAV 
methods, an aircraft is not limited to navigating directly 
to and from beacons or waypoints.  Instead the aircraft can 
fly an off-set course or even a course defined by user 
generated waypoints.  This conserves flight distance, 
reduces congestion, and permits instrument flight plans 
into airports without beacons.  The concept of RNAV was 
developed in the 1960s and has continued in popularity 
because of its efficiency.  Performance enhancements 
throughout global airspace systems directly target the 
additional benefits of improving RNAV. 
Despite the quickly evolving capabilities of GPS 
systems, the concepts of navigation integrity and 
containment are still in the deployment phase.  Most naval 
tactical aircraft do not have compatible equipment that 




A performance-based air traffic management system 
centers on the desire for reliable and consistent 
navigational solutions.  The focus shifts from specific 
equipment type to equipment independent capability.  
Aircraft, regardless of type of equipment installed, should 
have the capability to reliably remain within a specified 
volume of airspace for a majority of the time.   
For civil aircraft equipment in the US, the minimum 
navigation performance-based standards can be found in FAA 
Technical Standard Orders (TSO).  A TSO is often a list of 
minimum performance standards issued by the FAA for 
specific civil aviation materials, parts, processes, and 
appliances.  For international civil aviation, ICAO issues 
standards and recommended practices (SARP). 
The concept of required navigation performance (RNP) 
applies to the airspace and the systems designed to operate 
within a performance-based system.  The airspace or 
equipment is given a value based on the performance 
accuracy or capability required to fly within a specific 
airspace.  Aircraft operation within or access to a defined 
airspace may be limited by a lack of performance 
capability.   
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In order for a performance-based navigation system to 
demonstrate performance capability, the minimum operational 
performance standards (MOPS) must be defined.  The FAA has 
relied on RTCA for gathering input from members of the 
aviation industry to recommend MOPS for various systems. 
The MOPS for airborne supplemental navigation equipment 
using GPS are located in RTCA document 208 (DO-208).  TSO-
C129a, which is the TSO for airborne supplemental use of 
GPS, incorporates the MOPS listed in DO-208.  Standards for 
receivers with ground station based signal augmentation can 
be found in RTCA document 229C, Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide 
Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment. 
Military combat and combat support aircraft have PNT 
capabilities designed to operate in combat and otherwise 
stressed environments where civil PNT services are likely 
to be jammed or severely limited.  As a result, current 
military PNT systems exceed the RNP requirement for 
navigational accuracy.  However, these systems do not 
conform to the RNP requirements designed for civil 
operations such as commercial air carriers. 
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Components of a Performance-based System 
The critical concepts intrinsic to RNP systems are 
availability, accuracy, and containment [9].  Containment 
refers to a combination of system integrity and continuity.  
Most navigation systems in use in naval aviation today lack 
a suitable level of assurance in availability, containment  
integrity and continuity.  Each concept must be precisely 
understood to define appropriate requirements for future 
PNT solutions.  
A navigation system’s availability addresses the need 
for assurance of safe operation within unpredictable 
environments, of which Naval Aviators often find 
themselves.  Aviators must have confidence in the PNT 
system’s capability to reliably perform its required 
function with every initiation of an intended operation.  
Regardless of whether the changes in the environment are 
natural or man-made, the system has to be available when 
needed.   
Containment integrity is the idea that the region 
around an aircraft’s desired path can be defined, and that 
the probability that the aircraft does not remain in that 
region can be bounded [9].  A depiction of lateral cross-
track containment parameters is shown in figure 3. This 
10 
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Illustration of Lateral Cross-Track Containment Parameters 
Source:  http://pma209.navair.navy.mil/teams/navigation/cnsatm/rnp_rnav.asp 
30 Nov 2006 
illustration depicts a RNP 2 containment region.  An 
aircraft would be required to remain within 2 nautical 
miles of the desired path, 95 percent of the total flight 
time along that path.  The probability that the total 
system error would exceed the specified cross track 
containment limit, 4 nm in the above case, without 
annunciation must be less than 10-5 per flight hour [9]. 
Containment continuity is based on the capability of 
the aircraft’s navigation system to self-monitor and 
evaluate the validity of its own navigation solution.  
Errors in the navigation solution are detected by an 
algorithm.  The result of which must be a timely warning 
sent to the operator indicating that the system is not 
11 
 
useable for navigation.  Two common methods of monitoring 
the “goodness” of GPS navigation solutions are: GPS 
Integrity Channel (GIC) and Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM).  
GIC is a ground-based monitoring system.  Ground 
stations monitor the signals from all satellites in view.  
The ground station’s positions are known precisely and 
easily validate position calculations from satellites.  
This has the distinct advantage over a self-contained 
monitoring systems, in that satellite redundancy is not 
required to detect pseudorange errors or other satellite 
failures.  Once detected, the ground stations transmit the 
pseudorange errors or go-no-go signals to the user [10]. 
RAIM, as its name states, is self-contained and 
autonomous.  Traditional RAIM uses five satellites to 
detect a fault in its position solution.   Reception of six 
satellites is required for the GPS receiver to detect a 
fault in one satellite and exclude it from its position 
solution.  A RAIM equipped GPS receiver can also determine 
if sufficient satellite coverage will be available at a 
specific time, allowing the operator to select and plan an 
approach before reaching the terminal area environment. 
12 
 
The overall ability of a system, as a whole, to 
perform its intended function is the concept of continuity.  
As it applies to an aircraft’s capability of remaining 
within a specified volume of space, containment continuity 
is the probability that the navigational system will 
provide the information required to continuously remain 
within a specified volume of airspace.   
As airspace becomes more congested and technology 
solutions increase, safety of flight considerations will 
require all participants to meet a minimum standard of 
navigation capability.  The individual military services 
assume the burden of ensuring compliance with civil 
requirements in all aircraft.  Countries implementing 
specific navigation performance mandates may deny airspace 
entry to non-compliant aircraft.  This will certainly apply 




CHAPTER 2:  NAVAL AVIATION EVOLUTION 
The E-2C Hawkeye 
The E-2C Hawkeye was designed as an airborne early 
warning, combat command and control aircraft.  A complete 
description is located in the E-2C NATOPS Flight Manual 
[11].  A profile of the aircraft is shown in figure 4. The 
Hawkeye was built by Grumman Aerospace Corporation as a 
high-wing, twin engine, turboprop.  The aircraft has 
several unmistakably identifiable features, one of which is 
the 24-foot diameter, combination radar rotodome antenna.  





Source: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/e-2.htm, 30 Nov 2006 
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The two unique, eight-bladed Hamilton Sundstrand 
propellers are attached to two Rolls-Royce T56-A-427 
engines rated at 5,100 indicated shaft horsepower (ISHP).  
The combination of each engine makes the E-2C one of the 
most powerful, twin-engine turboprops in the world. 
The mission of the Hawkeye is to provide airborne 
early warning, detection and combat command and control in 
the context of complete battle space management.  Designed 
to be launched from the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, 
the E-2 is suited for missions around the globe. 
E-2C Navigation Systems 
The E-2C rolled off the assembly line in the early 
1970s with a navigation system that, at the time, was top-
of-the-line. Those system components are listed in table 1. 
[12]  
Table 1: Initial E-2C Navigation Components 
System 
Designation Long Name 
Short 
Name 
AN/ASN-92(V) Carrier Inertial Navigation 
System 
CAINS 
CP-10851AS Air Data Computer ADC 
AN/APN-l53(V Doppler Radar Navigation Set  
AN/ASN-50 Heading & Attitude Reference 
System 
HARS 
AN/ARN-52(V) Tactical Air Navigation System TACAN 




The original inertial navigation system, CAINS, is 
still in use in some E-2Cs operating today.  CAINS, 
although capable, is highly susceptible to position drift 
and tumbling gyros following catapult launches.  It also 
has a poor user interface.  The combination of these 
shortfalls illustrates the lack of RNP availability 
assurance. 
Since 1997, significant changes have been made to the 
aircraft’s navigation system.  Some of those changes are 
still underway today.  The Doppler navigation system was 
the first system to be removed.  The air data computer has 
been updated to a standard central air data computer by 
incorporating more solid state components.  The TACAN 
receiver was upgraded to the AN/ARN-118(v).  The 
integration of these more reliable systems has been a vast 
improvement.  However, the availability of newer, more 
capable systems has far out-paced the E-2’s system upgrade 
rate. 
Current E-2C Navigation Systems 
With the exception of a recent commercial, off-the-
shelf navigation system, the E-2’s navigation system does 
not meet most navigation performance standards.  The 
16 
 
Table 2: Current E-2C Navigation Components 
System 
Designation Long Name 
Short 
Name 
AN/ARN-151(V) GPS Receiver GPS 
GNS-530 Garmin GNS-530 NA 
AN/ASN-139 Strap down Ring Laser Gyro 
Carrier Inertial Navigation 
System  
CAINS II
AN/ARN-118(V) Tactical Air Navigation System TACAN 
CPU 140/A Standard Central Air Data 
Computer 
SCADC 
Hawkeye’s current navigation components are listed in  
table 2. 
The current integrated GPS, the AN/ARN-151(V), was a 
vast improvement to the navigation suite.  The ARN-151(V) 
has a five channel receiver, four of which are used at any 
one time to calculate position for use in determining 
navigation solutions.  The fifth channel tracks one extra 
satellite for use in the event of a satellite drop-out in 
one of the first four channels.  The system’s functions are 
controlled through one of two Multi-function Control 
Display Units (MFCDU). 
The ARN-151(V) is a PPS receiver which achieves 
position accuracies within a few meters.  However, the ARN-
151 is susceptible to frequent satellite reception drop-
outs, resulting in degraded reliability.  The drop-outs are 
17 
 
usually due to aircraft attitude or to antenna masking by 
part of the aircraft’s structure.  The aircraft’s position 
solution can be aided by the inertial navigation system. 
Aside from the GPS receiver and MFCDU, the aircraft’s 
navigation capability also includes two strapped-down ring 
laser gyroscopes and a TACAN receiver.  Both components 
should remain as part of the aircraft’s standard 
configuration for the foreseeable future. 
A recent upgrade to the E-2 navigation system was the 
Garmin GNS-530.  The GNS-530 is a commercial off-the-shelf 
GPS system that has FAA TSO-C129a, class A1 certification 
for area navigation to 0.3 nautical miles (nm). 
Additionally, the GNS-530 offers very high frequency (VHF), 
omni-directional radio range (VOR) navigation, frequency 
modulation (FM) immune instrument landing system (ILS) 
precision approach capability, a color moving map display, 
and an national air space (NAS) waypoint and instrument 
approach procedures navigation database.  Finally, the GNS-
530 has a 10-watt embedded VHF radio that is capable of 
both 8.33 kHz and 25 kHz channel spacing.   
The Navy completed testing of the GNS-530 in January 
2004 with a total cost of approximately $360,000.  The test 
program consisted of 11 flights, five days of lab testing 
18 
 
and 23 days of ground testing.  A majority of the tests 
focused on electromagnetic compatibility, human machine 
interface (HMI) characteristics and shipboard 
compatibility. 
The GNS-530 is, however, a very short-term solution to 
the E-2C navigation RNP shortfall.  The GNS-530 is not 
integrated into the E-2’s navigation data bus, which 
negates all of its desirable characteristics with regard to 
weapon system augmentation.  Additionally, the GNS-530 is 
only a standard precision receiver.  It is not suitable for 
GPS jammed environments or for combat operations where 
selective availability could once again introduce 
significant navigational errors. 
Future proposed components of the E-2C navigation 
system must be fully integrated with the aircraft’s weapon 
systems.  To meet the requirements of RNP, the next 
generation GPS receiver should be an all-in-view receiver 
with integrity monitoring capability.  An all-in-view GPS 
receiver has the ability to receive signals from all 
satellites above the horizon, usually 8 to 10 satellites, 
to determination position.  These requirements must be 
clearly stated within the functional requirements documents 
19 
 




CHAPTER 3:  APPLICABILITY OF AVIATION REGULATIONS 
Instrument Flight Rules and GPS 
Federal regulations are specific about the use of GPS 
in IMC conditions.  The GPS must be approved by the FAA 
according to the standards, or some equivalence, outlined 
in TSO-129a.  Depending on configuration, the installation 
must be completed in accordance with Advisory Circular 
AC20-138, AC20-130A or an equivalent. The aircraft must 
also have an alternate means of navigation, should the GPS 
system fail.  Future E-2 navigation equipment should be 
acquired with these requirements in mind. 
Applicability to State Aircraft 
The aforementioned requirements pertain only to civil 
aircraft.  The E-2, however, is a public aircraft or more 
specifically, it is a state aircraft. 
The definition of a public aircraft is located in 
Title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 40102(a)(37).  The 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the 
organization credited for forming ICAO, defines any 
aircraft engaged in customs, police and military services 
as a “state” aircraft.  State aircraft status is not 
granted by organization, nor is the US government required 
to make a declaration in writing of any such status.  There 
21 
 
is no requirement to carry proof of this status.  
Correspondingly, the FAA does not certify or attest to the 
airworthiness of state aircraft[13].  As such, the E-2C has 
never been required to obtain a type certificate (TC) or a 
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for newly installed 
equipment, like the GNS-530.   
Compliance Now Applies to State Aircraft 
To prevent violation of civil air traffic clearances, 
and to ensure safe separation of military and civil air 
traffic, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
has issued policy stating that military aircraft must 
conform with civil airspace PNT requirements.  This policy 
which defines the acquisition, operation and sustainment of 
PNT systems is found in the 2003 CJCS, Master Positioning, 
Navigation and Timing Plan [1].  
In short, all military aircraft must have appropriate 
instruments and navigation equipment that are compatible to 
the airspace in which they are to be flown.  Historically, 
as with all state aircraft, the E-2 was not required to 
conform to civil aviation system standards.  However, now 
that non-compliance may compromise safety and access, the 
Navy assumes the burden of complying with federal and 




In the United States, certification of civil aircraft 
or aircraft systems falls under the purview of the FAA.  
The process details how to design, build, test and operate 
an aircraft.  One of the instructions governing the process 
is “Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related 
Products”, Order 8130.2F [14].  FAA certification standards 
rely heavily on work by the RTCA.  The basis of GPS 
certification standards, as set for by TSO-C129a and 
others, refers predominantly to RTCA minimum operational 
performance specifications (MOPS) for technical validity. 
The Cost of Certification 
When discussing the cost of a new system, the fact 
that every component of a system must be certified, as well 
as the entire system of navigation components, is often 
overlooked.  The cost associated with installing a new 
component, such as a GPS receiver, includes developing and 
testing the new component along with its integration with 
currently installed systems. 
The process of introducing new operational 
capabilities has become more costly for civil aviation 
industries, in terms of both time and money.  According to 
the “Executive Summary of the Final Report of RTCA Task 
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Force 4 Certification”[15], the dynamic growth and 
globalization of aviation technology has outpaced the 
government’s certification policies and regulatory 
oversight.  The cost required to keep pace with improving 
technologies has inhibited the introduction of additional 
safety enhancements.  Therefore, an acquisition strategy 
that capitalizes on previously certified technology 




CHAPTER 4:  HAWKEYE NAVIGATION, THE ROAD AHEAD 
Foundations of Future Compliance 
To acquire capable navigation systems that are cost 
effective and suitable for the E-2 mission, the Navy should 
leave the development and integration of all components to 
the contractor or manufacturer.  The Navy should only 
evaluate the system for the mission and environment in 
which it would be operated.  Naval aviation’s acquisition 
burden would then be to evaluate the system beyond the 
certification requirements.  The scope of developmental and 
operational test would be greatly reduced.  To obtain the 
right solution the first time, the requirements documents 
must clearly capture the appropriate civil document 
standards.  A simplified acquisition flow diagram is 
located in Figure A-1. 
NAVAIR, with the aid of various contractors, plans to 
bring an integrated GPS RNP RNAV system into the Hawkeye’s 
cockpit.  Those plans include both the E-2C and follow-on 
E-2D models.  The exact type of GPS navigation system 
solution should result from balancing capability with 
available funding.  Lessons learned from previous GPS 
evaluations must be applied to these future systems. 
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Any future GPS based RNP RNAV solution should take 
advantage of industry obtainable FAA certifications.  The 
remainder of the self-certification process would include 
only highly focused, targeted evaluations with the intent 
to answer requirements in the areas of availability, 
integrity and containment. 
Scope of Previous GPS Testing 
The GNS-530 underwent a minimal, yet focused 
evaluation period.  Since the GNS-530 is TSO certified, 
many of the tests performed on the GNS-530 were unrelated 
to RNP RNAV or IMC flight.  A majority of the GNS-530’s 
test results that are reviewed below. 
The evaluation concentrated on installation, human 
machine interface (HMI) and carrier suitability.  In 
addition, the performance of the GNS-530 was evaluated for 
its ability to provide accurate position information and 
guidance during en route, terminal, and non-precision 
approaches.  Position accuracy was adequate, and waypoint 
sequencing provided the aircrew with proper and timely 
visual indications of navigation information and course 
guidance.  
  Bench testing was limited to the communications 
system since the GNS-530 has TSO GPS certification.  The 
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receiver and transmitter characteristics were evaluated to 
verify the manufacturer’s specifications.  Baseline testing 
required the construction of a break out box specifically 
tailored to isolate the GNS-530 from the aircraft ICS and 
to interconnect with our testing equipment.  Test equipment 
included, but was not limited to, the use of the IFR 2947, 
1840-A Audio Power Meter, as well as the HP54600A 
oscilloscope.   
  Ground testing verified the power on self tests, and 
static position satellite reception.  Ground testing also 
evaluated the systems compatibility, susceptibility and 
vulnerability in various electromagnetic environments. 
The in-flight evaluation focused on the GNS-530’s 
compatibility with the E-2C Hawkeye’s mission.  One of the 
primary compatibility areas of interest was the E-2’s 
electromagnetic environment.  It is unique to the aircraft 
when airborne.  The aircraft’s structures, specifically the 
rotodome antenna, propellers and vertical tails were also 
potentially system degraders.  Once it was determined that 
there were no problems with signal reception due to 
airframe masking, antenna patterns were not recorded.  
Lastly, the flight evaluation targeted the operational 
suitability of using the communication and navigation 
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functions in terminal environments.  A summary of GNS-530 
test points are located in Table B-1 and Table B-2. 
Lessons Learned from the GNS-530 Evaluation 
The GNS-530 was evaluated for SPS L1 GPS signal 
reception during static ground test and in-flight dynamic 
maneuvering.  The GNS-530 demonstrated excellent signal 
reception while its antenna was in full view of orbiting 
Space Vehicles (SV).  Dynamic maneuver testing including 
360-deg right and left turns at bank angles of 15, 30 and 
45 degrees.  Test data revealed that at bank angles of 30 
degrees, one or two signal levels were significantly 
reduced or lost due to masking by the aircraft’s vertical 
tails, rotodome, and legacy GPS antenna fairing.  However, 
signal reception remained adequate for accurate navigation 
solution. 
The GNS-530 receiver was evaluated for electromagnetic 
susceptibility and compatibility other onboard E-2C during 
all phases of testing.  The GNS-530 satellite status was 
observed while each of the ARC-182 UHF/VHF transceivers 
were tuned to specific frequencies and transmitted on for 
20 seconds.  The frequencies were tested in accordance with 
the test as listed in Table B-1 and Table B-2.  No adverse 
effects to GPS signal strengths, navigation indications, 
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GNS-530 display quality, alerts and warnings, or satellite 
DOP were observed.  Transmissions from the E-2 radar and 
other avionics systems also indicated no adverse effects or 
interference to GPS signal strengths, ADI and BDHI 
indications, GNS-530 display quality, alerts and warnings, 
or receiver DOP. 
Within the cockpit, the distance from a pilot’s or 
copilot’s outstretched arm to the GNS-530 controls was 
approximately 2 feet.  The placement required the operator 
to lean forward against the seat straps, pulling with 20 to 
30 pounds of force.  Also, while manipulating the controls, 
the operator must look away from all aircraft attitude and 
performance reference displays to focus on the 
manipulations required to operate the control interface 
knobs and buttons.  Entering or modifying a flight plan 
required several minutes to perform, distracting the pilot 
or copilot from flight duties for an excessive time frame 
and increasing pilot fatigue.  The in-flight operation of 
the GNS-530 should be delegated to the copilot. 
Position data was compared to AN/ARN-151 position data 
during all regimes of normal aircraft maneuvering.  During 
ground testing and prior to each flight, the Dilution of 
Precision (DOP) and Estimated Position Error (EPE) values 
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were observed on the GNS-530. DOP values were less than 1.4 
and EPE values were less than 19 feet.  During ground 
evaluation, the position difference between the GNS-530 and 
the AN/ARN-151 was 18.52 meters.  The maximum in-flight 
position difference between the GNS-530 and the AN/ARN-151 
was indeterminate.  There were insufficient numbers of data 
points collected during test flights to precisely evaluate 
the accuracy of the GNS-530’s GPS position.  All data were 
hand recorded and resulted in excessive time between 
successive data points.  The figure of merit (FOM) of the 
AN/ARN-151 drifted from 1, most accurate to 5, 
significantly less accurate.  Use of the AN/ARN-151 
receiver was not a good "truth data" source since the FOM 
was known to vary.   
Overall, the performance of the GNS-530 was able to 
provide accurate position information and guidance during 
en route, terminal, and nonprecision approaches.  Position 
accuracy was adequate, and waypoint sequencing provided the 
aircrew with proper and timely visual indications of 
navigation information and course guidance.  The 
performance of the GNS-530, as installed, satisfied FAA 
criteria for supplemental navigation use in conjunction 
with a sole means navigation system.  The GNS-530 
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installation in the E-2C Hawkeye should have been approved 
for immediate use a supplemental means of navigation under 
visual and instrument flight rules within oceanic en route, 
domestic en route and terminal areas. 
Future GPS System Evaluations 
Specific mission suitability evaluation of GPS 
receivers or integrated GPS navigation systems with 
capabilities designed for specific military requirements, 
such as highly dynamic maneuvering, anti-spoofing and anti-
jamming should be evaluated prior to fielding future 
satellite based navigation systems in hostile environments.  
Integrated GPS receivers would have to satisfy many more 
requirements than the GNS-530 evaluation.  For purposes of 
demonstrating RNP RNAV compliance, a PPS receiver should be 
evaluated as a SPS receiver with proposed performance 
equivalent to a differential GPS. 
To date, there has been no formal requirement for an 
improved flight control system in the E-2.  With the 
exception of heading, attitude and altitude hold, the E-2’s 
automated flight control system does not receive steering 
cues from the navigation system.  The GNS-530 does not 
supply any navigation information to the flight controls.  
However, if in future configurations the navigation system 
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and flight control system are coupled, an extensive 
evaluation would be required. 
Just as SPS receivers are required to receive the L1 
signal and C/A code, optimum PPS GPS receiver based 
navigation solutions should be capability of receiving and 
exploiting all available civil GNSS signals.  This would 
include the L2 and L5 signals.  In addition, the receiver 
should also use signals from the GLONASS and Galileo 
satellite navigation systems.  Global operation would imply 
selectively choosing optimal signal source. 
RNAV evaluation of future satellite-based navigation 
systems would, therefore, focus on the following areas: 
path estimation, path definition, user interface and system 
features and capabilities.  A comprehensive list of tests, 
as they apply to these areas, is listed in appendix B.   
Table B-3 is a proposed bench test matrix.  Table B-4 is a 
proposed ground test matrix and Table B-5 has proposed test 
items for a flight evaluation.  Compliance items are listed 
in the first column.  The second column contains a 
description of the compliance item.  The third column 
contains limits for bench test and space for assessment 
comments for the ground and flight tests.  A HMI checklist 
is contained in Table B-6. 
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Lessons learned from previous evaluations illustrate 
that; above all else, the pilot and copilot have a clear 
and unobstructed view of all displayed data when in the 
seated position.  Also, the displays used for maneuver 
anticipation and for failure annunciation must be located 
within the pilot's primary field of view.  The brilliance 
of any display must be adjustable to levels suitable for 
data interpretation under all cockpit ambient light 
conditions ranging from total darkness to reflected 
sunlight.  The approach mode annunciation and distance to 
waypoint in the approach mode must be clearly visible to 
the pilot with the least practicable deviation from his 
normal position and from his line of vision when he is 
looking forward along the fight path. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Every acquisition strategy places the mission 
capability of a system as the first priority.  For the 
mission of global navigation, naval aircraft must have the 
capability to meet the applicable civil requirements.  
Based on previous system evaluations and current regulatory 
recommendations, the following recommendations apply to all 
future navigation system programs. 
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All future navigation solutions should state within 
their respective specification documents, the highest level 
civil certification attained.  The test and evaluation 
process should honor the level of certification and not 
retest to that level. 
For systems lacking certification, the author 
recommends using the compliance items listed in Table B-3 
through Table B-5.  Compliance with these items, in 
addition to those required for mission suitability, would 
ensure a reliable navigation capability in all 
environments. 
When accuracy validation is required, a highly 
reliable “truth data” source is imperative.  Only the most 
sensitive test ranges for fly-over data or an independent, 
onboard installation with precise calibration would be 
suitable. 
Future navigation solutions should be hybrid 
navigation systems capable of exploiting all available 
satellite systems and all satellites in view.  This would 
include having the capability to exploit differential GPS 
technology with integrity monitoring when the service is 
available.   When not available, the systems should be able 
to switch to military precision service with augmentation 
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where needed.  Satellite based augmentation is not required 
for PPS, however there may be a need such for capability 
near military landing facilities.  For navigational 
purposes, correctly coded PPS receivers have the 
performance equivalence of highly augmented civil, 
commercial of the shelf receivers.   
Reuse of technology and components is always desired; 
however, the question remains whether or not a current 
system can, with modification, fulfill future emergent 
environmental or mission requirements.  The ultimate goal 
is compliance using current or new technology without 
duplicating cost and effort through developmental and 
operational test.  
 Future acquisition strategies should acquire new GPS 
navigation technologies that meet or exceed the minimum 
civil requirements.  Military PPS receivers should have the 
same integrity monitoring, alerting and assurances 
technology SPS receivers possess now.  In the interim, 
current technologies, such as the GNS-530, should be 
quickly self-certified and put into operational use.  The 
E-2C Hawkeye will then be assured of having accurate, self-
contained, all-weather access to any foreign environment, 
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Figure A-1:  



















Table B-1: Garmin Ground Test Summary 
Test Remarks Pass-Fail Criteria 
Verify Jeppesen data base 
currency Check database currency following power on. 
Jeppesen database is loaded and 
currency is within 28 days. 
Crosscheck instrument 
panel self-test on the 
Garmin. 
Crosscheck ADI CDI and BDHI with test page. 
Record ADI and BDHI indications 
during self-test. 
No warning flag displayed. 
Verify a sufficient no. of 
satellites are acquired to provide 
GPS 3D navigation. Integrity light 
remains extinguished. 
GPS signal reception and 
integrity check. 
Verify no. of satellites acquired on 
satellite page. 
Garmin GPS position data should 
agree with current aircraft 
position data. 
Verify accuracy of GPS 
position data. 
Crosscheck Garmin derived GPS position with 
ARN-151 position. 
EMC compatibility & 
Susceptibility of GPS 
with all VHF radios. 
Conduct VHF Comm. on 121.15, 121.175, 
121.200, 131.250, 131.275 and 131.300 MHz. 
Note affects on satellite page. 
GPS satellite reception is not 
affected by VHF transmissions. 
Loss of power/signal to 
GPS receiver and external 
displays. 
Simulate a loss of signal to the GPS and 
loss of power to the associated displays. 
Annunciator indications provide 
proper warnings for unreliable GPS 
signal and warning flags are 




Table B-2: Garmin Flight Test Summary 
Test Remarks Pass-Fail Criteria 
EMC compatibility & 
Susceptibility of GPS with 
all VHF radios (Comm 
1/2/5), E-2C Radar, & 
other avionics systems. 
Conduct VHF Comm. on 121.15, 121.175, 
121.200, 131.250, 131.275 and 131.300 MHz. 
Operate the E-2C Radar. 
GPS satellite reception is not 
affected by VHF, RADAR, or other 
Avionics transmissions. 
During level and maneuvering 
flight the Garmin GPS position 
data should agree with aircraft 
derived position. 
Verify accuracy of GPS 
position data. 
Cross check Garmin derived GPS position 
against ARN-151 position. 
Evaluate GNS-530 
capability to create, 
activate, and modify an 
existing GPS flight plan.  
Functionality. 
 
Create a flight plan and activate. Modify 
flight plan, and perform direct-to 
function. HMI. Workload. 
Operator was able to modify 
existing plan and perform a direct 
to function from an active flight 
plan. 
GPS integrity is not affected. 
Satisfactory satellite coverage 
during holding pattern, 360 deg 
turns both right/left at 15, 30, & 
45 deg AOB. 
Verify nav data during 
normal aircraft maneuvers 
and 360 turns at AOB = 15, 
30, & 45 deg  
 
Airframe masking: GPS nav mode selected, 
monitor integrity indicator and satellite 
data for uninterrupted coverage. 
Cross check GPS guidance against 
TACAN approach information. GPS 
provided correct guidance to 
execute satisfactory approaches to 




Fly multiple approaches and transitions 
from enroute to terminal to approach using 
the nav data base. Monitor display 
sensitivities, annunciations, waypoint 
sequencing. VMC only. 










Table B-3: Proposed Non-certified GPS Bench Test 
Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
Satellite visibility, 
selection and atmospheric 
compensation  
Note signals from which the receiver is 
able to derive positions and RNAV 
information under interference conditions. 
GPS-provided iono correction model 
Tropospheric corrections are applied. 
Data decoded continuously. 
Clock and ephemeris parameters used after 
they have been successfully collected twice 
Iono data is used after is has been 
successfully collected twice. 
Satellite clock corrections, include 
relativistic corrections, are applied to 
pseudorange after smoothing (if applicable) 
GPS satellites are not mistaken due to 
cross-correlation during acquisition or 
reacquisition 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
IF or RF receiver capable of 
receiving L1, L2, or L5.  
Potential reception of GLONASS and 
Galileo.  
System selects and uses iono 
models. System correctly applies 
Tropo corrections. Downlink data 
is decoded continuously 
System validates ephemeris before 
use. System validates iono data 
before use. System correctly 
applies satellite clock info 




System acquires satellites and determines 
position without initialization 
information. 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
TTFF ≤ 5 minutes, given; 
initialization of LAT/LONG within 
60 nm., TIME/DATE within 
1 minute, valid almanac, and 
unobstructed satellite visibility; 
under the specified interference 
conditions 
GPS Satellite Acquisition 
Time 
During steady state operation satellites 
are acquired and incorporated into position 
solution 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 







Table B-3: Continued 
 




Reacquires satellite and computes pseudo- 
range within 10 seconds when the remaining 
satellites provide a GDOP of 6 or less 
(from point when signal is available after 
a loss interval up to 30 seconds) 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
Reacquire and use in position 
solution within 10 seconds. 
Satellite Tracking System capable of tracking a minimum of 8 satellites  
Shown to track 8 satellites 
simultaneously.  
Dynamic Tracking 
Equipment maintains accuracy during 
representative en route and terminal area 
maneuvering 
System maintains accuracy during 
normal dynamics under the 
specified signal power and 
interference conditions. Abnormal 
maneuvers do not cause misleading 
information. Re-acquisitions are 
performed, as specified, when the 
abnormal maneuvers complete. 
Proper indication of loss of 
navigation and loss of integrity 










performance of RTCA/DO-228. 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
Tracks satellites at -136 dBm 
Equipment Burnout 
Protection 
System withstands in-band CWI @ +20 dBm at 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
Navigation Alert 
Notification is indicated of loss of 
navigation indication within 1 second 
following: 
a) Loss of power 
b) System malfunctions 
c) If for 5 seconds insufficient number of 
satellites for position solution. 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
Alert visible given during given 
circumstances within 1 second 
En Route and Terminal Navigation Requirements 
Accuracy 
Requirement met under the minimum signal 
conditions defined in DO-229C 2.1.1.10 and 
interference conditions defined in  
Appendix C. 
Horizontal radial position fixing 
error ≤ 100 m, 95th percentile, 
when HDOP is normalized to 
1.5. 
Integrity 
The hardware and software shall be designed 
such that the output of misleading 
information, considered to be a major 
failure condition, shall be improbable. 
Conduct a safety assessment to evaluate the 
system's implementation against known 
failure conditions. 
Hardware: show that failures of 
the equipment that result in 
misleading information are not 
more probable than 10-5/flight 
hour. 
 
Software: See AC 20-115B, which 
references RTCA/DO-178B 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
Dynamic Tracking 
Meet en route accuracy requirements during 
maneuvering flight.  During maneuvers, 
equipment shall not output misleading 
information.  When the aircraft returns to 
normal maneuvers from abnormal maneuvers, 
the equipment shall meet the steady-state 
reacquisition requirements of: 
DO-229C Section 2.1.1.9. 
Ground Speed:    500 kts 
Horizontal Accel:   +2.7, -0.6g 
Vertical Accel:   +3.2, -1.0g 
Position Output 
Position shall represent the WGS-84 
position of the aircraft antenna (or center 
of navigation) at the time of 
applicability.  The equipment shall provide 
an electronic data interface capable of 
transmitting digital data containing 
position, velocity, integrity and other 
pertinent data. 
DO-229C 2.1.2.6 
Output based on WGS-84 model 
Position Output Update 
Rate 
Minimum update rate of position outputs 
used for navigation Position outputs once per second 
Position Output Latency 
 
The interval between the time of the 
measurement and the time of applicability 
of the position 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
En Route and Terminal Integrity Monitoring 
FDE - Provided 
Integrity 
Monitoring 
System has autonomous FDE capability: 
FDE uses URA broadcast to modify modes 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
FDE algorithm sets:  
(1)SA mode, if any satellite URA's 
are greater than 16 meters 
(2)SA off mode, if the URA for 
every satellite being used is less 
than or equal to 16 meters 
Time to Alert Time to alert 8 seconds DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 




Analysis validates documentation and tests 
prove systems missed alert probability 
 ≤ 0.001. 
Probability of missed alert 
 ≤ 0.001 
Probability of false alert ≤ 10-
5/hour. Average duration and 




Probability of false alert ≤ 10-5/hour. 
Average duration and probability of a false 
alert will be < 3.33x10-7. 
Failed Exclusion 
Probability 
Validate documentation. Test proves 
system’s failed exclusion probability 
 ≤ 10-3/hour. 
Probability of failed exclusion ≤ 
10-3/hour 
Availability 
Analysis validation proves availability of 
detection ≥ 99.9 % and availability of 
exclusion ≥ 98.0 % 
Availability of detection ≥ 99.9% 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
Nonprecision Approach Requirements 
Accuracy 
Requirement met under the minimum signal 
conditions defined in DO-229C 2.1.1.10 and 
interference conditions defined in  
Appendix C. 
Horizontal radial position fixing 
error ≤ 100 m, 95th percentile, 
when HDOP is normalized to 
1.5 
Integrity 
The hardware and software shall be designed 
such that the output of misleading 
information, considered to be a major 
failure condition, shall be improbable. 
Conduct a safety assessment to evaluate the 
system's implementation against known 
failure conditions 
Hardware: show that failures of 
the equipment that result in 
misleading information are not 
more probable than 10-5/flight 
hour. 
 
Software: See AC 20-115B, which 
references RTCA/DO-178B 
Satellite Tracking Track all satellites in view, with mask angle greater than 5 degrees Track a minimum of 8 satellites 
Dynamic Tracking 
Meet en route accuracy requirements during 
maneuvering flight.  During maneuvers, 
equipment shall not output misleading 
information.  When the aircraft returns to 
normal maneuvers from abnormal maneuvers, 
the equipment shall meet the steady-state 
reacquisition requirements of: 
DO-229C Section 2.1.1.9 
Ground Speed:    500 kts 
Horizontal Accel:   +2.7, -0.6g 
Vertical Accel:   +3.2, -1.0g 
Position Output 
Position shall represent the WGS-84 
position of the aircraft antenna (or center 
of navigation) at the time of 
applicability.  The equipment shall provide 
an electronic data interface capable of 
transmitting digital data containing 
position, velocity, integrity and other 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
pertinent data. 
DO-229C 2.1.2.6 
Position Output Update 
Rate 
Minimum update rate of position outputs 
used for navigation Position outputs once per second 
Position Output Latency 
 
The interval between the time of the 
measurement and the time of applicability 
of the position 
Latency ≤ 500 msec 
Nonprecision Approach Integrity Monitoring 
FDE - Provided 
Integrity 
Monitoring 
System has autonomous FDE capability: 
FDE uses URA broadcast to modify modes 
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 
FDE algorithm sets:  
(1)SA mode, if any satellite URA's 
are greater than 16 meters 
(2)SA off mode, if the URA for 
every satellite being used is less 
than or equal to 16 meters 
Time to Alert Time to alert 8 seconds DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19 




Analysis validates documentation and tests 
prove systems missed alert probability 
 ≤ 0.001. 
Probability of missed alert 
 ≤ 0.001 
Probability of false alert ≤ 10-
5/hour. Average duration and 




Probability of false alert ≤ 10-5/hour. 
Average duration and probability of a false 
alert will be < 3.33x10-7. 
Failed Exclusion 
Probability 
Validate documentation. Test proves 
system’s failed exclusion probability 
 ≤ 10-3/hour. 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
Availability 
Analysis validation proves availability of 
detection ≥ 99.9 % and availability of 
exclusion ≥ 98.0 % 
Availability of detection ≥ 99.9% 
Availability of exclusion ≥ 98.0% 
Position Estimation 
Present Position 
Assess alphanumeric latitude and longitude 
display of aircrafts present position  
DO-283 2.2.1.1 
Display resolution of 0.1 minutes 
or better 
Estimate of Position 
Uncertainty 
Assess display of Estimated Position 
Uncertainty.  Note system notifications if 
integrity limit is exceeded 
DO-283 2.2.1.2 
Display resolution of 0.1 nm or 
better 
Probability of true position 
falling outside containment radius 
shall be less than 
10-5/hour 
Containment Radius 
Verify true position falls within estimated 
position containment radius 
DO-283 2.2.1.3 
Position Initialization 
If manual system initialization is 
available, verify resolution 
DO-283 2.2.1.4 
Position entry resolution of 0.1 
minute or better 
Navigation Aid Selection 
 
If the system has the option to choose 
between GPS and INS, navigation operations 




Note alerts and annunciations 
during or following changes in 
navigation emitter source 
 
Path Definition 







Table B-3: Continued 
 
Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
Fix(DF), Initial Fix(IF), Radius-to-
Fix(RF), Track-to-Fix (TF) 
DO-283 2.2.2.1 
Flight Planning 
Assess the capability to insert, delete 
waypoints into active and inactive flight 
plans.  Assess ease of entering/activating 
a flight plan. Assess the ease of appending 
or removing SID/STAR/Approach procedure 
DO-283 2.2.2.2 
Comment on ease and intuitiveness 
of each operation 
Great circle distance from the 
present position to the closest 
point on the active leg of the 
course. ±20 nm. Minimum resolution 
of 0.01 nm for distances less than 
1 nm. 0.1 for distances less than 
9.9 nm and 1.0 nm beyond. 
Cross-Track Deviation 
Display 
Verify the display and electrical output of 
cross track deviation while varying RNP 
Type, aircraft position, desired track, fix 
geometry and leg type 
DO-283 2.2.4.1 
Waypoint Distance Display 
 
Verify distance display to active fix, next 
fix or destination has the resolution of 
0.1 nm or better.  The distance display 
should accommodate a distance display of at 
least 9999 nm. 
DO-283 2.2.4.2 
Resolution ≤ 0.1 nm 
Distance displayed ≥ 9999 nm 
Presence of TO-FROM indication.  




Verify TO-FROM indication is continuously 





Feedback shall be supplied during data 
entry, with confirmation of input action 
prior to activation based upon that input. 
Any equipment prompts must be easily 
understood. 
Confirmation of input supplied. 
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Compliance Item Remarks Limits/Requirements 
DO-229C 3.3.1.2.2 
Waypoint or Leg Sequencing 
 
Equipment shall automatically sequence 
waypoints in the active flight plan.  If 
automatic sequencing is suspended for any 
reason, the equipment shall retain the 
active flight plan for later selection. 
If the equipment provides the capability to 
suspend and unsuspend automatic sequencing 
as a discrete action (SUSP), the equipment 
shall continuously annunciate when waypoint 
sequencing has been suspended.  If the 
pilot deselects SUSP mode, automatic 
sequencing of waypoints shall resume upon 
reaching the current waypoint if the 
current waypoint is in the flight plan. 
DO-229C 2.2.1.2.4 
Waypoint within active flight plan 
sequence automatically as aircraft 
progresses along flight planned 
path.  Pilot is able to suspend 
and unsuspend waypoint sequencing. 
Position Display 
Display all positions of latitude and 
longitude with a minimum resolution of 0.01 
min or better. 
DO-283 2.2.4.6 




Failures or loss of signal shall be 
output/displayed within one second of the 
onset of any of the following conditions: 
a. Loss of power (loss of function is an 
acceptable indicator); 
b. Equipment malfunction or failure  
c. A condition lasting five seconds or more 
where there are an inadequate number of 
satellites to compute a position solution; 
d. Fault detection detects a position 
failure, which cannot be excluded within 
the time-to-alert. 
Fault indication: ≤ 1 second  
 
Time-to-Alert 
Oceanic/Remote: 1 minute 
En Route: 30 seconds 







Table B-3: Continued 
 





Measure display latency, display update 
rates, and time to provide flight guidance 
during nominal and heavy processing 
conditions. The test objective is to verify 
that response times are meet under both 
normal and high usage conditions. 
DO-229C 2.5.11.1.3 
Display latency: ≤ 1 second  
Display update rate:  
    en route       ≤ 1 Hz 
    terminal mode  ≤ 1 Hz  
Course guidance: 5 seconds 
Time between accepting changes to 
active flight plan and outputting 









Table B-4: Proposed Non-certified GPS Ground Test 
Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
Equipment Operation 
Limitations 
Equipment operation limitations that 
consider sensor availability and 
navigational aid coverage should be 
contained in the aircraft flight manual and 
clearly identified in the 
aircraft cockpit by means of placards. 
 
Conformity Inspection 
Visually inspect the installed equipment to 
determine the use of acceptable workmanship 
and engineering practices. 
Ref. DO-229 3.1.4.1.1 
 
Antenna Installation 
GPS antenna should be separated as far as 
possible from other antennas (e.g., 
UHF/VHF, SATCOM, and HF) and the windscreen 
(to prevent case-to antenna coupling) 
Ref. DO-229 3.1.1.2 
 
Cockpit Layout of 
Installed Equipment 
Evaluate the cockpit layout of the 
installed equipment with emphasis on 
equipment controls, applicable circuit 
breakers (labels and accessibility), power 
switching arrangement, and related 
indicators, displays, annunciators, etc. 




Accessing controls do not contribute to 
discomfort or fatigue.  Controls installed 
for in-flight operation shall be readily 
accessible from the pilot's seated 
position.  Only single-hand operation 
should be required, the controls should be 
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Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
should not obscure pertinent displays. 
Electromagnetic 
Compatibility 
Particular attention should be given to 
other "L" band equipment, such as 
TCAS or SATCOM equipment; VHF transmissions 
on the frequencies listed below; high 
frequency (HF) communications systems; and 
other transmitting equipment (e.g., ACARS, 
AFIS, Flightfone, etc.). 
 
The following VHF frequencies shall be 
evaluated: 
121.150 MHz 131.250 MHz 
121.175 MHz 131.275 MHz 






Assess display visibility of the controls, 
displays, and annunciators from pilot and 




Shall be no navigation or display 
degradation from E-2 avionics systems. 
Equipment shall not be installed in such a 
manner as to be the source of objectionable 
conducted or radiated interference. 
 
Inadvertent Turnoff Minimum risks of unwanted system turn off.  
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Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
Crew Workload 
Rate workload for performing routine 
functions such as entering and activating 
flight plan, SID, STAR, flight plan change, 
user waypoint definition. 




System degradation below the minimum 
acceptable performance required for phase 
of flight shall be clearly annunciated in 
the cockpit, and the visual indication of 
such degradation shall be prominently 
displayed within the primary field of view 
of the pilot. 
 
Switching and Transfer 
Functions 
System display and navigation solution 
shall not be degraded by electrical bus 
switching transients less than 1.6 second 
in duration. 





All equipment failure annunciators should 
be tested during preflight to verify proper 
operation. 
 










Table B-5: Proposed Non-Certified GPS Flight Test 
Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
EMC compatibility & 
Susceptibility of GPS with 
all VHF radios (Comm 
1/2/6), E-2C Radar, & 
other avionics systems. 
Particular attention should be given to 
other "L" band equipment, such as 
TCAS or SATCOM equipment; UHF/VHF 
transmissions on the frequencies listed 
below; high frequency (HF) communications 
systems; and especially the E-2 Radar 
system. 
 
The following VHF frequencies shall be 
evaluated: 
121.150 MHz 131.250 MHz 
121.175 MHz 131.275 MHz 
121.200 MHz 131.300 MHz 
 
The following UHF frequencies shall be 
evaluated: 
225.125 MHz 325.125 MHz 
269.125 MHz 369.125 MHz 




Switching and Transfer 
Functions 
System display and navigation solution 
shall not be degraded by electrical bus 
switching transients less than 1.6 second 
in duration. 
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.2.1 
 
Failure Modes and 
Annunciations 
Review, and verify where appropriate 
through demonstration, various failure 
modes and associated annunciations, such as 








Table B-5: Continued 
 
Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
reception or GPS equipment failure. Verify 
that a warning associated with loss of 
navigation is accompanied by a visible 
indication within the pilot's normal field 
of view. Verify that audible alarms are 
sufficiently loud and of appropriate pitch 
quality, duration, and pattern. Verify that 
alarms are easily deactivated (but not 
easily deactivated inadvertently). 
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.2 
Display Visibility 
Assess display visibility of the controls, 
displays, and annunciators from pilot and 
copilot design eye point of view 
DO-229 3.3.1.1.1 
 
Controls and Display 
Readability 
Assess readability in total darkness to 
bright sunlight (to include indirect, 
reflected ambient conditions). No 
distracting cockpit glare or reflections 
may be introduced by the GPS/WAAS equipment 
and all controls must be illuminated for 
identification and ease of use. Colors, 
small symbols, and small alpha-numerics 
must be clearly distinguishable, brightness 
of (non-adjustable) annunciators must be 
acceptable, and brightness and contrast 
adjustments must be acceptable. Characters 
embedded in text must be distinguishable. 
Night lighting shall be consistent with 
other cockpit lighting. 
DO-283 2.1.7.2 
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Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
Assess page labeling: 





Evaluate the accessibility and usability of 
all controls pertaining to GPS. Verify that 
data entry procedures are in conformance 
with the requirements of Sections 2.2.1.2 
and 3.3.1.2.2  
 
Displayed GPS Navigation 
Parameters 
Evaluate displayed GPS navigation 
parameters on interface cockpit instruments 
such as HSI, CDI, distance display, 
electronic flight instruments system 
(EFIS), moving maps, fuel management 
systems, etc. Verify that display minimum 
discernible movement accuracy of the 
centered display, resolution of the 
electrical output, linearity of the display 
and/or electrical output, and display 




Continuity of Navigation 
Data 
Verify continuity of navigation data during 
normal aircraft maneuvering for the 




Verify that execution of an aircraft 
heading change to intercept a direct leg 
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Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
Fly-By Turn Performance 
Conduct several fly-by turns. Verify that 
the equipment accomplishes the turn as a 





For installations where GPS outputs can 
drive a display that is shared in common 
with other navigation equipment (e.g., 
TACAN, VOR/DME, ILS) the annunciation of 
the system in use shall be clearly 
indicated. Deviation from the desired track 
shall be displayed to the range and 
resolution requirements. Demonstrate 
minimum discernible movement, accuracy of 
the centered display, resolution of the 
electrical output, linearity of the display 




Evaluate work load 
requited to create, 
activate, or modify GPS 
flight plans. 
 
Rate workload for performing routine 
functions such as entering and activating 
flight plan, SID, STAR, flight plan change, 
user waypoint definition. 
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.6 
 
Verify nav data during 
normal aircraft maneuvers 
and 360 turns at AOB = 15, 
30, & 45 deg  
 
Airframe masking: GPS nav mode selected, 
monitor integrity indicator and satellite 





Fly multiple approaches and transitions 
from enroute to terminal to approach using 
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Compliance Item Remarks Assessment 
sensitivities, annunciations, waypoint 
sequencing. VMC only. Cross check GPS 
guidance against TACAN/VOR or INS 
information. 






Table B-6: Component Human Machine Interface Checklist 
Operator Activity  Assessment (Pass/Fail/Comments) 
Quantify force required to activate knobs/buttons.   
Quantify risk of inadvertent activation or deactivation based 
on control operation feedback 
 
Verify single-hand operations, controls identifiable, use does 
not obscure displays.  
 
Controls logically arranged according to functional groups, 
sequence of use, and frequency of use.  
 
Quantify chance of error, easy of error recovery, overall 
usability.  
 
Evaluate knob shape/size does not interfere with use, 
distinguishable, aids in pilots use.  
 
Evaluate label construction: discernible and readable on 
equipment.  
 
Evaluate label placement: display is unobstructed by use.  
Evaluate Terminology: Labels describe function of knob, 
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